Oklahoma Supreme Court Rules Against Deutsche On Two Different Cases – On the Same Day
By Daniel Edstrom
DTC Systems, Inc.
From 4closurefraud.org - Attorney Phillip Taylor takes the foreclosure fight in Oklahoma to the Oklahoma Supreme Court and gets handed two favorable rulings on the same day.
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company vs. Byram quote:
CONCLUSION
¶11 It is a fundamental precept of the law to expect a foreclosing party to actually be in possession of its claimed interest in the note, and have the proper supporting documentation in hand when filing suit, showing the history of the note, so that the defendant is duly apprised of the rights of the plaintiff. This is accomplished by showing the party is a holder of the instrument or a nonholder in possession of the instrument who has the rights of a holder, or a person not in possession of the instrument who is entitled to enforce the instrument pursuant to 12A O.S. 2001, § 3-309 or 12A O.S. 2001, § 3-418. Likewise, for the homeowners, absent adjudication on the underlying indebtedness, the dismissal cannot cancel their obligation arising from an authenticated note, or insulate them from foreclosure proceedings based on proven delinquency. See, U.S. Bank National Association v. Kimball 27 A.3d 1087, 75 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 100, 2011 VT 81 (VT 2011); and Indymac Bank, F.S.B. v. Yano-Horoski, 78 A.D.3d 895, 912 N.Y.S.2d 239 (2010).
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS Continue reading “Oklahoma Supreme Court Rules Against Deutsche On Two Different Cases – On the Same Day” »
Deeds of Trust in California are Practically and Substantially only Mortgages with a Power of Sale
By Daniel Edstrom
DTC Systems, Inc.
Thanks to Simonee for this one – Monterey SP Partnership v. WL Bangham, Inc., 777 P. 2d 623 – Cal: Supreme Court 1989
The California Supreme Court states:
As we explained in describing “the anomalous nature of deeds of trust in this state” (Bank of Italy etc. Assn. v. Bentley (1933) 217 Cal. 644, 657 [20 P.2d 940]), “deeds of trust, except for the passage of title for the purpose of the trust, are practically and substantially only mortgages with a power of sale….” (Ibid.) In practical effect, if not in legal parlance, a deed of trust is a lien on the property.
And a few other tidbits:
“Just as a panda is not a true bear, a trustee of a deed of trust is not a true trustee.” (Stephens, Partain & Cunningham v. Hollis (1987) 196 Cal. App.3d 948, 955 [242 Cal. Rptr. 251].)
Download opinion here: http://dtc-systems.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Monterey_SP_Partnership_vs_WL_Bangham.pdf
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Deciding Hundreds of Years of Real Property Law Regarding MERS
By Daniel Edstrom
DTC Systems, Inc.
In Eaton vs. FNMA, the Supreme Judicial Court is asking for additional briefings to help with the following “issue”:
1/16/2012 #17
ORDER :Having heard oral argument and considered the written submissions of the parties and the various amici curiae, the court hereby invites supplemental briefing on the points described below. Supplemental briefs shall not exceed fifteen pages and shall be filed on or before January 23, 2012. 1. It has been claimed that requiring a unity of the mortgage and the underlying promissory note, in order for there to be a valid foreclosure, would cloud any title that has a foreclosure in the chain of title, regardless of how long ago the foreclosure occurred. The parties are invited to address whether they believe that such a requirement would have such an effect, and if so, what legal or practical measures exist that might limit the consequences of such a requirement. 2. It also has been suggested that, if the court were to hold that unity of the mortgage and note is required under existing law, the court’s holding should be applied prospectively only. The parties are invited to indicate on what authority they believe (or do not believe) the court could make such a holding prospective only.
